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Abstract
We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable
qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a
class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality
ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive
probability, the buyer (expected) utility can be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium. It is
also argued that low quality sellers invest more in deceptive advertising the better is their reputation
vis-a`-vis potential clients — i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to
invest in deceptive advertising when they produce a low quality product. Finally, we characterize the
optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish deceptive
practices. When the objective of this agency is to maximize consumer surplus, its monitoring effort
is larger than under social welfare maximization.
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1 Introduction
The importance of advertising as a competitive tool has long been recognized — see, e.g., Bagwell
(2007) among others. Firms usually engage in advertising campaigns to inform potential clients about
the existence of their brand and products. Hence, investments in quality promotion and aggressive
marketing strategies, often involving comparative claims, allow firms to compete more fiercely by stealing
customers one another, triggering price wars that push prices down toward the competitive level. This is
particularly so in industries where products are vertically differentiated and firms offering homogeneous
goods compete for customers based on quality — e.g., service, optionals, special features, etc.
When the quality of an item on sale can be verified before purchase (the so called search goods),
these complementary sales channels are unlikely to harm consumers insofar as they reduce search costs
and allow to better match tastes with consumption choices — see, e.g., Lewis and Sappington (1994) and
Johnson and Myatt (2006) among others. But, very often, product quality is not fully verifiable in real
life — e.g., credence goods. In these cases advertising might have a dark side, namely low quality firms
may use marketing channels to pull the wool over consumers’ eyes and induce them into purchases they
would have otherwise not undertaken. These practices are known as misleading or deceptive advertising,
which is loosely1 defined as any explicit (or even implicit) statement that has the potential to deceive
consumers, meaning that its embedded claim may not realize after the purchase.
This potential danger has been well recognized by antitrust and competition policy authorities all
over the world — see, e.g., the FTC Policy Statement on Deception (1982).2 Essentially, when firms
can safely engage in deceptive advertising, the civil law principle stating that customers have a “right
to know” what they are purchasing is likely to be violated. In addition, policy makers have grown wary
of potential market distortions of deceptive practices as they tend to induce unfair competition.3 As a
result, misleading advertising is nowadays generally sanctioned according to country specific regulations
designed to protect consumers and foster competition. The major challenge implementing such policies,
however, is that deceptive advertising might be indistinguishable from truthful one.
A large debate among legal experts and policymakers, both at national and international level has
emphasized that one key step would be the identification of successful strategies allowing to spot and
sanction unlawful advertising practices. In the US, for instance, the FTC regulates unfair and deceptive
practices on a case-by-case basis and occasionally with industry-wide regulations. Industry standards
1The actual statute defines false advertising as a “means of advertisement other than labeling, which is misleading in
a material respect; and in determining whether an advertisement is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among
other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or any combination
thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or
material with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the commodity to which the advertisement relates
under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual.” (Wilson, Lee.
“The Advertising Law Guide: A Friendly Desktop Reference for Advertising Professionals”. Allworth Press, NY, 2000).
2Available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm
3In fact, while consumer protection laws are formally distinct from anti-trust law, the intimate connection between the
two is reflected by the fact that in most countries the authority on customer protection and anti-trust is held by a single
Agency.
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are also adopted by individual firms, by advertisers’ associations, and often by the media — such as
newspapers, magazines, radio, television and the Internet. Publishers and broadcasters, for example,
have realized that dishonest advertising reflects unfavorably on them as well as the businesses doing the
advertising. As a consequence, the National Advertising Division has established a National Advertising
Review Board comprised of advertisers, advertising agencies, and the general public to deal with com-
plaints. When the Board receives a complaint from a competing business or consumer, it examines the
complaint. If the ad is deemed deceptive, the board puts pressure on advertisers through persuasion,
publicity, or, in extreme cases, legal action.
The analysis we offer in this paper is a contribution to this debate. The research questions that
will be addressed are the following: Why do firms engage in deceptive advertising? What are the cost-
benefit trade-offs that shape misleading advertising decisions? What are their key determinants and
welfare effects?
To address these issues we consider a simple environment where two sellers (firms) compete a` la
Bertrand to attract a representative buyer (consumer). Sellers produce vertically differentiated products
whose quality is not observable by the buyer and unverifiable in court. Qualities are (perfectly) negatively
correlated, and a low quality seller may choose to deceive the buyer so as to induce him into a wrong
purchase. For given price, the buyer’s objective is to minimize the danger of a wrong purchase. He
knows that one of the two sellers supplies a low quality good and hence uses all the available information
to make inference about sellers’ qualities.
Within this setting, we first note that equilibria where sellers deceive the buyer are incompatible with
separating behavior at the pricing stage, as otherwise the information about qualities would be fully
reflected by the equilibrium prices and there would be no scope for deception. Then, we characterize a
class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their type and low quality ones
deceive the buyer with some (endogenous) probability. Interestingly, in these equilibria sellers invest more
in deceptive advertising the better is their (exogenous) reputation — i.e., the more a firm is trusted by its
potential clients, the greater are its incentives to invest in deceptive advertising when it produces a low
quality product. Surprisingly, though, even if low quality goods are purchased with positive probability
in such equilibria, the ex-ante welfare of the buyer can be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium,
where the high quality item is purchased with certainty. This is due to a novel pro-competitive effect,
which rests upon the buyer’s ignorance about sellers’ product quality in a pooling outcome: since the low
quality seller can induce the buyer to purchase its item through deceptive advertising, the high quality
seller has less market power than in a separating equilibrium. As a consequence, pooling prices might
be lower than separating ones. This is particularly so if the difference between the two quality levels is
large enough, in which case the beneficial effect of ignorance on the high quality seller monopoly power
is magnified.
Interestingly, this prediction, is very different than the findings of Heidhues, Ko˝szegi, and Murooka
(2012) who also analyze market for deceptive products but in a context with naive consumers. In contrast
to them, our deceptive equilibria are pro-competitive vis-a`-vis the corresponding no deception market
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outcome: in our model the possibility of deception allows low quality sellers to stay on the market
alongside high quality ones and this generates a downward pressure on prices. Therefore, our analysis
highlights a novel tension between the goals of enhancing competition and that of protecting the quality
of market public information. This suggests that authorities seeking to maximize consumer surplus may
have conflicting statutory objectives: increasing competition may lead worsen transparency vis-a`-vis
final buyers (and vice-versa).
Nevertheless, from an efficiency point of view — i.e., total welfare maximization — we find that
pooling equilibria are unambiguously worse than separating ones. This is because the beneficial effect
on the buyer utility stemming from a reduced market power of the high quality sellers washes out when
aggregating the players’ (expected) utilities/profits. And, pooling equilibria are inefficient as they involve
socially wasteful misleading advertising. Finally, with no surprise, low quality sellers unambiguously gain
from coordinating on a pooling equilibrium, whereas high quality ones prefer separating ones.
Building on these results, we then analyze a simple policy that involves the enforcement of a (costly)
monitoring technology aimed at detecting misleading and deceptive conducts. More precisely, we assume
that a benevolent planner (e.g., a regulatory agency) commits to check the truthfulness of sellers’ ads
randomly, and if a lie is discovered a mandated full reimbursement of the price paid by the cheated
buyer is enforced. In this setting, we find that a planner concerned with total welfare maximization
prefers more intense monitoring than one that cares about customers only. This is because misleading
advertising is decreasing with respect to monitoring intensity, and the buyer might enjoy to be cheated
and then reimbursed rather than paying a positive price for a high quality item. We also show that,
thanks to this effect, the impact of an increase of the pooling price on the optimal monitoring intensity is
non-monotone, suggesting the counter intuitive conclusion that in response to higher prices, consumers
may benefit from lower protection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the growing literature
on deceptive practices. Section 3 lies down the model. Section 4 describes the properties of equilibria
with “full coverage” — i.e., when the ads reach the buyer with probability 1, and provides the charac-
terization analysis of pooling and separating equilibria. Section 5 addresses selection and welfare issues
and performs the relevant comparative statics analysis. In Section 6 we perform the policy analysis and
discuss the behavior of a benevolent social planner that invests in a detection technology to identify and
sanction deceiving firms. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Related literature
Our paper shares common features with the growing literature on deceptive practices. A seminal contri-
bution to this debate is that of Anderson and Renault (2009) who study a model where competing firms
disclose horizontally differentiated attributes (valued differently by heterogeneous consumers), assuming
that product qualities are known.4 In their paper product qualities are a device to indicate large or
4See also Anderson and Renault (2006) for a similar disclosure approach with a monopolistic firm.
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small firms in terms of their equilibrium market shares with a strong/high quality firm having a larger
share than a weak/low quality firm. If market sizes are very different (product qualities are sufficiently
different), the equilibrium of the disclosure game has only the weak firm disclosing horizontal attributes
and the strong one not. If comparative advertising is allowed, then the weak firm will disclose the
horizontal attributes of both products (and so it is truly comparative). The key difference between our
model and theirs is that we focus on deceptive practices while in their model information disclosure is
always truthful.
Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2009), instead, study an entry game where the entrant’s quality is
uncertain and comparative advertising — i.e., comparing quality of one’s own product to that of a
rival’s — empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or
misleading. They show that comparative advertising can be a credible signal of high quality in instances
where generic advertising is also viable. In contrast to them, in our model there is no way to credibly
signal high quality because firms cannot file for court intervention — i.e., we do not allow for explicit
comparative claims. Moreover, in our model the quality of both firms is unknown, while in their set
up the incumbent quality is common knowledge. These differences allow us to analyze the welfare
implications of deceptive advertising from a more symmetric perspective relative to that of the entry
perspective taken in their paper. Finally, while in their paper the entrant can signal its quality neither
with price alone nor with price and generic advertising in our model buyers also rely on prices when
updating their beliefs.
Hattori and Higashida (2012) study the welfare effects of persuasive advertising in a duopoly model
where horizontally differentiated firms that compete by setting prices, engage in deceptive advertising.
They characterize the welfare effects of alternative forms of regulatory policies, by emphasizing (among
other things) the positive effects of market interventions aimed at educating consumers. By contrast,
our objective is to study a context where customers are Bayes rational and the scope for deceptive
advertising has a direct impact on prices through the informative content of the ads sent by firms to
potential clients.
Heidhues, Ko˝szegi, and Murooka (2012) studies conditions facilitating profitable deception in a com-
petitive market for potentially deceptive products. Firms selling homogenous products simultaneously
set a transparent “up-front price” and an “additional price”, and decide whether to shroud the addi-
tional price from naive consumers. The major difference between our models is that our consumers are
rational while theirs are naive. As a result they find that deceptive equilibria where firms shroud prices
have anti-competitive features whereby firms want rivals to obtain sufficient rents from deception so as
to resist the temptation of unshrouding and breaking the equilibrium engaging in full price competition.
To the contrary, our deceptive equilibria are pro-competitive vis-a`-vis the corresponding no deception
market outcome: in our model the possibility of deception allows low quality producers to stay on the
market alongside high quality ones and this generates a downward pressure on prices.
The work on de-marketing by Miklo´s-Thal and Zhang (2013) borrows attribution theory from psy-
chology and builds a model where sellers may prefer to under-advertise their high quality product in
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equilibrium. By so doing, sellers “confuse” potential future buyers as to the true cause of possibly
low sales, which may be attributed to the low profile marketing choice (observed) rather than to the
low quality of the item on sale (unobserved). Our work shares common features with Miklo´s-Thal and
Zhang (2013) in that buyers are Bayes-rational and discount information in a similar fashion. However,
a fundamental difference between our and their model regards the way advertising affects preferences:
while in their analysis advertising increases demand by arousing potential buyers’ curiosity — a reduced
form of persuasive advertising — in our setting advertising persuades customers only through changes
in probabilities leaving unaltered their attitude towards learning an item’s quality — i.e., demand is
enhanced only through subjective probability appraisal.
Wang (2011) builds a model where a monopolist offers information about its product features and then
buyers may search for additional product information in order to better evaluate it before purchasing.
He focuses on the amount of information offered through ads and searched by consumers showing that
the equilibrium price is non linear in the search cost and that information disclosure and acquisition
strategies may or may not coexist. The equilibrium price non linearity follows from the fact that, for
medium search costs, the monopolist hides information and lowers strategically the price to reduce the
incentive for the buyer to search additional information. In so doing he maximizes the surplus he can
extract from buyers. The pattern is reverted when search costs are too low or too high and the price
looses the strategic effect just described. In this model advertising can be not fully informative but it
cannot be misleading, which is instead a key feature of our analysis.
Of course, stemming from Chamberlin (1933) a large body of IO literature has cast advertising
choices within the traditional oligopoly framework — see, e.g., Bagwell (2007) for an excellent survey.
These models highlight a number of important features of advertising choices, such as their informative5
and persuasive6 role, the link between advertising and market structure7 and welfare properties, but
they are all rather silent on the potential danger of deceptive practices, which is instead the novel aspect
emphasized in our analysis.
Finally, at a more abstract level, it is worth mentioning that our analysis also relates to the mechanism
design literature on informed principals. Martimort and Moreira (2010) is the first paper to analyze an
abstract common agency game where two privately informed principals deal with a common uninformed
agent. In a more complex environment, they show that when two principals directly communicate with
a (common) agent, both separating and pooling outcomes can emerge. Our equilibrium characterization
is somewhat coherent with this contribution even if in our setting sellers are able to communicate with
the buyer only through ads — i.e., there is no direct communication — and lies (deceptive ads) are costly
— i.e., they may fail to reach the target. A further key difference between our set-up Martimort and
Moreira (2010) is that we only assume linear prices while they allow for fully non-linear contracts. This
5See, e.g., Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Orzach, Overgaard, and Tauman (2002) and
Wernerfelt (1994) for more on informative advertising.
6See, e.g., Banerjee and Bandyopadhyay (2003), Becker and Murphy (1993) and Dixit and Norman (1978).
7See, e.g., Bagwell and Ramey (1988), Bagwell and Ramey (1991), Chu (1992) and Galeotti and Moraga-Gonza´lez
(2008).
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restriction is compelling given the scope of our application and allows to derive simple policy predictions
that would be otherwise difficult to obtain.
3 The model
Players. Two sellers supply identical products with different qualities to a single (representative) buyer.
Sellers (indexed by i = 1, 2) compete by setting prices and each supplies a product of quality qi ∈ {l, h},
where l stays for low and h for high. The buyer purchases one unit of product from either seller. The
utility from consuming a item of quality qi is θ (qi) — i.e., the utility of consuming a low (resp. high)
quality item is θ (l) = θl (resp. θ (h) = θh), where θh − θl = 1 with no loss of insights. His net utility
from consumption is
u (θ (qi) , pi) = θ (qi)− pi,
when buying from seller i supplying quality qi at a price pi. No consumption entails zero utility.
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Communication. Prices are observed before purchase, while product qualities are advertised through
informative ads. We assume that, whenever the quality of a good is ex-post different from the one
advertised ex-ante, it is impossible to claim the difference — i.e., sellers supply credence goods (see, e.g.,
Leland (1979), Cabral (2000) and Wernerfelt (1988) among many others). Hence, there is scope for
deceptive advertising.
Each seller advertises its product by sending a number of ads stating that it is of high quality. The
higher the number of ads, the larger the probability they reach the buyer. We define the probability of
reaching the buyer as ‘coverage’.9 Specifically, if seller i produces a high quality product, it advertises
truthfully and its coverage is ρi ∈ [0, 1] — i.e., its ads reach the buyer with probability ρi. If seller i is of
low quality, its ads deceive the buyer and its coverage is µi ∈ [0, 1] — i.e., its ads reach the buyer with
probability µi. Deceptive advertising has a cost c (µi) =
µ2i
2ψ (with ψ > 0) while truthful advertising is
costless. The justification of this assumption (a version of which is also made in Miklo´s-Thal and Zhang
(2013)) is that making something inherently of bad quality appear of good quality is more costly than
simply declare the good quality of a high quality good. This assumption is harmless if the advertising
costs are so low that the high quality seller will always choose a full coverage advertising campaign. If
not, the model becomes more complicated without providing any new significant insight.
Uncertainty. Qualities are perfectly negatively correlated — i.e., q1 = l whenever q2 = h and vice
versa — and this is common knowledge to all players. Hence, each seller is aware of both own and the
8The hypothesis of a single representative buyer is made only for tractability and to isolate the pure effects of deceptive
advertising from those stemming from product segmentation that would arise with a downward sloping demand function.
Our results would not change if there was a continuum of buyers and firms can perfectly discriminate among them. See,
however, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Galeotti and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2008) for models with advertising, differentiated
products and segmentation.
9This is sometimes referred to as ‘advertising rate’ in the literature.
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competitor’s product quality, while the buyer knows that there is only one good quality product but
cannot tell which. The interpretation of this assumption is that product qualities can always be ranked:
it is known in the market that some products are better than others, but the winner is not obvious
outright. The sellers know which product is best out of their insider/specialist information, while the
buyer only has a prior about that.10
The buyer prior belief about seller i’s quality is τ i = Pr (qi = h) = Pr (q−i = l), with τ i = 1− τ−i for
each i = 1, 2.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
t=0 The state q = (q1, q2) realizes and sellers learn it.
t=1 Sellers simultaneously and independently choose coverages and prices.
t=2 The buyer receives ads (if any) and observes the posted prices.
t=3 He decides which store to patronize. Trade (if any) takes place.
Figure (1) below illustrates the time-line of the game
Figure 1: Timing of the advertising game
True market state
(q1, q2) is revealed
to sellers
Time 0
-
Sellers simultaneously
set ρ1 or µ1 and p1
and µ2 or ρ2 and p2
Time 1
-
Buyer observes ads
and may buy from
either seller
Time 2 and 3
Equilibrium concept and strategies. Since the game is sequential and involves asymmetric infor-
mation, the equilibrium concept is weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green (1995)). Let ai = (ρi, µi, pi) be seller i’s action profile: where ρi ∈ [0, 1] and µi ∈ [0, 1]
are, respectively, its truthful and deceptive ads coverage, and pi the posted price. Actions are taken
simultaneously by sellers at Time 1. Hence, a strategy profile σi (.) for seller i is a mapping of the types’
realization q ∈ {(h, l) , (l, h)} ≡ Q into an action profile ai. The buyer’s action space is {buy 1, buy 2,
not buy}. With no loss of generality we will focus on equilibria where trade occurs with certainty —
i.e., Pr(not buy) = 0 — and denote αi = Pr(buy i) = 1− Pr(buy j).
10Of course, some products may have many features so that they perform well along some of them and do poorly along
other dimensions. In such cases — which may not be infrequent for sufficiently complex products — it may well be the
case that qualities rank the same, which would be of no interest for our purposes.
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4 Full coverage and positive deception equilibria
In this section we characterize the class of equilibria where the buyer receives a good signal from the
high quality seller with certainty — i.e., ρi = 1. We will label these outcomes as full coverage equilibria.
However, within this class of equilibria, we are interested in those with positive deception. That is,
outcomes of the game where low-quality sellers invest in deceptive advertising (µi > 0 but typically
µi < 1). In so doing, we will first describe how sellers’ adverting choices affect the buyer’s behavior and
then turn to the equilibrium characterization.
Consider first Stage 2: the buyer observes the posted prices and at most one ad from each seller.
Using this information he updates his beliefs on products’ qualities consistently (whenever possible) with
equilibrium strategies. Let σ(.)= {σi (.)}i=1,2 be sellers’ strategy profile. Let s = (s1, s2) be the vector
of messages received by the buyer with si ∈ Si ≡ {h,∅} and ∅ standing for no information received. A
strategy profile σ induces a signals’ probability distribution η (s|σ) : S1×S2 → [0, 1]. Given the strategy
profile σ, denote by βσ (qi|s,p) the buyer’s beliefs about seller i’s quality qi upon observing the vector
of prices p and the profile of ads s. Slightly abusing notation, the Bayes rule then implies
βσ (qi|s,p) =
∑
qj
Pr (qi|s,p (qi, qj)) η (s|σ (qi, qj))∑
q Pr (qi|s,p (q)) η (s|σ (q))
, (1)
where Pr (q|s,p) is the probability assigned by the buyer to state q given sellers’ pricing rule p (q) and
the profile of realized ads s.
Equation 1 nests two updating processes: one based on information conveyed by prices, the other
based on signals and coverage strategies. In fact, whenever equilibrium prices are different conditionally
on sellers’ types, they convey full information about quality — i.e., Pr (q|s,p (.)) ∈ {0, 1} and, conse-
quently, βσ (qi|s,p) ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, sellers separate so that ads have no informative value. On
the other hand, when both sellers charge the same price regardless of their type, no information can be
inferred from prices. Hence, ads are the only information available to the buyer to make his consump-
tion decision — i.e., Pr (qi = h|p) = τ i while βσ (qi|s,σ) depends non trivially on equilibrium coverage
decisions through η (s|σ).11
As a result, given a pair of signals s and prices p and a profile of strategies σ, the buyer will patronize
seller i (resp. j) if and only if∑
qi
βσ (qi|s,p) θ (qi)− pi >
∑
qj
βσ (qj |s,p) θ (qj)− pj (resp. <) ⇒
αi (s,p) = 1 (resp. αi (s,p) = 0).
When indifferent he randomizes — i.e., he buys from seller i with probability αi (s,p) ∈ (0, 1).
11In other words, prices don’t convey more information than the one already incorporated into prior beliefs.
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Seller i’s optimization program when it supplies a low quality item is
max
pi≥0,µi∈[0,1]
{∑
si
Pr (si)αi (si, sj = h,p) pi − c (µi)
}
,
where Pr (si = h) = 1 − Pr (si = ∅) = µi for each i = 1, 2. Notice that, in a full coverage equilibrium
the buyer always gets a signal sj = h from the high quality seller. Therefore, if he does not receive an
ad from seller i he can immediately infer that i is of low quality, due to perfect (negative) correlation of
sellers’ qualities.
Seller i’s optimization program when it supplies a high quality item is
max
pi≥0
∑
sj
Pr (sj)αi (si = h, sj ,p) pi
 .
That is, high quality sellers simply maximize revenues since truthful advertising is costless.
Building on this characterization, we are now ready to prove the following preliminary lemma that
is helpful to understand the nature of the problem at hand. In particular, it shows that equilibria where
sellers engage in deceptive advertising must involve pooling along the price dimension.
Lemma 1. A separating equilibrium where prices reveal qualities — i.e., such that sellers of different
qualities post different prices — features no deceptive advertising.
The economic intuition of this result is straightforward. In a separating equilibrium sellers perfectly
reveal their quality through prices. Hence, there is no scope for deception since misleading advertising is
costly. As a result, deceptive advertising can only emerge in a pooling equilibrium — i.e., in an outcome
of the game where prices do not convey information about qualities. In what follows we will therefore
focus on this class of equilibria. To do so, however, we have to specify off-equilibrium beliefs — i.e., the
buyer’s beliefs about sellers’ qualities whenever he observes a price different from the expected (pooling)
one.
A1 Whenever a seller posts an off-equilibrium price, the buyer assigns to this seller probability 1 of
selling a low quality product.
This assumption is standard in the literature and is for instance imposed also in Miklo´s-Thal and
Zhang (2013). Later on in the analysis we will argue that this restriction is indeed appealing as it satfies
a common refinement in signaling games — i.e., Divinity (D1) introduced by Banks and Sobel (1987).
Finally, to rule out corner solutions where low quality sellers deceive the buyer with probability 1 we
assume throughout:
A2 The equilibrium deception level of the low quality sellers is always smaller than 1 — i.e., µi < 1.
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In terms of the primitives of the model, this requires
ψ < min
{
1,
2
2θl + 1
}
. (A2)
Ruling out equilibria with full coverage by both sellers makes the buyer’s updating process non-trivial.
In fact, with corner solutions, no information is exchanged in equilibrium beyond the one incorporated
in prior beliefs.
4.1 Positive deception (pooling) equilibria
In this section we characterize the set of pooling equilibria with positive deception under the off-
equilibrium beliefs specified in A1. Consider a candidate equilibrium where sellers post the same price
(say p∗) regardless of their quality. Moreover, let µ∗i be seller i’s investment in deceptive advertising and
denote by α∗i the buyer’s equilibrium purchasing rule.
Buyer’s behavior. To begin with, we consider the buyer’s optimization and updating behavior. In a
pooling equilibrium, the buyer observes one good signal (h) and either a nil (∅) or another good signal.
Hence, the bad quality seller is surely detected when its ad misses the target — i.e., when it is not
received by the buyer. As a consequence
βσ∗ (qi = h|si = h, sj = ∅,σ∗) = 1,
βσ∗ (qi = h|si = ∅, sj = h,σ∗) = 0,
where σ∗ = (µ∗,p∗). When, instead, the buyer observes a good signal from both sellers, he realizes that
one of them is deceiving him, but he is uncertain about the identity of this seller. As a consequence, he
must update beliefs on qualities based on equilibrium strategies — i.e., applying (1)
βσ∗ (q1 = h|s1 = h, s2 = h,σ∗) =
τ1µ
∗
2
τ1µ∗2 + τ2µ∗1
,
βσ∗ (q2 = h|s1 = h, s2 = h,σ∗) =
τ2µ
∗
1
τ2µ∗1 + τ1µ∗2
.
In order to characterize the buyer’s purchasing rule it is useful to introduce a simple but important
preliminary result. In a pooling equilibrium the buyer’s optimal purchasing decision only depends on
the inference he is able to draw from the received ads because sellers charge the same price regardless of
their types. Hence, he is indifferent between buying from either sellers only when his posteriors are the
same — i.e., when the deception ratio µ∗1/µ∗2 equals the relative ‘trust’ that (behind the veil of ignorance)
the buyer avails to the two sellers τ1/τ2.
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Lemma 2. Assume τ1µ
∗
2 = τ2µ
∗
1, then
α∗i (si = h, s−i = h,p
∗) = τ i ∀i = 1, 2.
The intuition for this result is as follows: if deceptive choices are such that the buyer’s posteriors are
the same, then there is not enough evidence to unravel sellers’ qualities and the purchasing rule must
be based only on priors.
Summuing up, for any given (pooling) price p∗ that satisfies the buyer’s participation constraint,
upon receiving two good signals, the equilibrium purchasing rule is
α∗i (si = h, s−i = h,p
∗) =

1 ⇔ τ iµ∗−i > τ−iµ∗i
α∗i ∈ (0, 1) ⇔ τ iµ∗−i = τ−iµ∗i
0 ⇔ τ iµ∗−i < τ−iµ∗i
.
Finally, given sellers’ equilibrium choices, the buyer must have an incentive to buy at the prevailing
pooling price — i.e.,∑
q1
βσ∗ (q1|s,σ∗) θ (q1)− p∗ =
∑
q2
βσ∗ (q2|s,σ∗) θ (q2)− p∗ = θl+θh2 − p∗ ≥ 0 ⇔ p∗ ≤ θl + 12 , (2)
where θl+θh2 = θl+
1
2 is the maximal price that the buyer is willing to pay when he perceives the two sellers
as being equally likely to supply a high quality item — i.e., the expected quality when no information
can be learned from prices and ads. Clearly, this price is higher the closer is the low quality item to the
high quality one.
Equilibrium deception choice. Given the buyer’s equilibrium behavior characterized above, we will
now study how low quality sellers chose their equilibrium deception level. For any given (candidate
equilibrium) pooling price p∗, the optimization program of seller i when it is of low quality is
max
µi∈[0,1]
{µiα∗i (si = h, sj = h,σ∗) p∗ − c (µi)} ,
whose first-order condition (necessary and sufficient) for an optimum yields
p∗α∗i (si = h, sj = h,σ
∗)− µ
∗
i
ψ
= 0 ⇒ µ∗i = ψp∗α∗i (si = h, sj = h,σ∗) . (3)
Essentially, a low quality seller invests more in deceptive advertising the higher its per ad expected
sales revenue — i.e., the larger the probability of making a sale, α∗i (.), and the higher the pooling price,
p∗ — and the lower the marginal cost of deceiving the buyer — i.e., the higher the parameter ψ.
Equilibrium pooling prices. Having analyzed the buyer’s equilibrium behavior and the sellers’ equi-
librium deception choices, we can now characterize the set of equilibrium pooling prices.
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An equilibrium price p∗ ≥ 0 needs to satisfy two intuitive requirements: (i) it must meet the buyer’s
participation constraint in equation (2); (ii) it must not be vulnerable to deviations by low as well as
high quality sellers — i.e., no seller has to gain from posting a price different than p∗ and setting a
deception level different from µ∗i .
First, notice that seller i cannot gain from investing a deception level different from µ∗i unless it
does not plan to deviate at the pricing stage too. This follows from the optimality condition (3) and
the fact that coverage decisions are unobservable — i.e., changing only the investment level in deceptive
advertising has no strategic impact on the behavior of the buyer and the rival, but it only alters the own
expected revenues. Hence, a potentially profitable deviation must necessarily involve a price change,
which under A1 triggers the off-equilibrium belief that the deviant seller is perceived by the buyer as
the low quality one. As a consequence, a successful price deviation involves no deception to begin with.
Let αi (pi) be the buyer’s choice rule when he observes the off-equilibrium price pi, and denote by
pidi (p
∗|l) ≡ max
pi
{αi (pi) pi : αi (pi) = 1⇔ pi < p∗ − 1} = p∗ − 1,
be the expected deviation profit of seller i. That is, the expected profit that seller i makes when charging
a price pi low enough to attract the buyer — i.e., such that the rival makes no sales even if it is perceived
by the buyer as a high quality seller. Recalling that θh − θl = 1, this requires θl − pi > θh − p∗ if and
only if pi < p
∗ − 1. Clearly, this expected profit is increasing in p∗ since the incentive to undercut the
rival is larger when the (candidate) equilibrium price is higher.
By the same token, denote by
pi∗i (p
∗|l) ≡ max
µi
{
α∗i (si = h, sj = h,σ
∗)µip
∗ − µ
2
i
2ψ
}
=
ψτ2i p
∗2
2
, (4)
the equilibrium expected profit of a low quality seller. Notice that the above expression is increasing
and convex in p∗ as opposed to (4.1) that is linear in p∗. This is for two reasons. When the equilibrium
price p∗ increases, there is not only an expansion of the low quality seller’s revenue, but there is also
an expansion of the net benefits from deceptive advertising. Hence, an increase in p∗ not only increases
sales revenues but, ceteris paribus, it also increases the incentive to invest in misleading advertising.
Recalling that α∗i = τ i by Lemma 2, the relevant no deviation constraint for seller i is
pidi (p
∗|l) ≤ pi∗i (p∗|l) ⇔ p∗ − 1 ≤
ψτ2i p
∗2
2
.
Hence, low quality sellers have no incentive to deviate if and only if
p∗ − 1− ψp∗2τ22 ≤ 0. (5)
where, hereafter, τ ≡ mini=1,2 τ i < 12 will denote the lowest prior assigned by the buyer to either seller.
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The set of solutions of inequality (5), hereafter P ′ (l), is defined as
p∗ ∈ P ′ (l) ≡ {p∗ : p∗ ∈ [0, p∗ (l)] ∪ [p∗ (l) ,+∞]} ,
where it is easy to verify that
1 < p∗ (l) ≡ 1−
√
1−2ψτ2
ψτ2
≤ p∗ (l) ≡ 1+
√
1−2ψτ2
ψτ2
.
The structure of the set P ′(l) reflects the idea that relatively small pooling prices p∗ cannot be easily
undercut by a low quality seller because this would yield a too low revenue to the deviant. Nevertheless,
a relatively large pooling price may also be not vulnerable to a price deviation by a low quality seller.
This is because when sellers charge a high price in equilibrium, the seller producing a low quality item
invests relatively more in deceptive advertising, which (other things being equal) increases its selling
probability, whereby making a deviation from this outcome unprofitable.
Of course, the buyer must find it convenient to buy the item at equilibrium. Hence, the intersection
between the set of prices that satisfy participation constraint (2) and P ′(l) defines the set of pooling
prices that are not vulnerable to deviations by low quality sellers and that secure trade at equilibrium
— i.e.,
P∗ (l) ≡ P ′ (l) ∩ {p∗ : p∗ ≤ θl + 12} .
Consider now seller i’s deviation when it produces the high quality item. Of course, seller i has no
incentive to reduce its coverage because truthful advertising is costless. Hence, a profitable deviation of
a high quality seller must only involve a price deviation. Let
pidi (p
∗|h) ≡ max
pi
{αi (pi) pi : αi (pi) = 1⇔ pi < p∗ − 1} = p∗ − 1,
be seller i’s maximal (expected) profit from deviation when the rival charges p∗ and the buyer’s belief
structure follows A1. Notice that this expression is the same as that obtained for a low cost seller. This
is because, under A1, deviant sellers are perceived by the buyer as low quality ones.
Similarly, let
pi∗i (p
∗|h) ≡ [(1− µ∗j ) + µ∗jα∗i (si = h, sj = h,σ∗)] p∗ = [1− ψ (1− τ i)2 p∗] p∗ (6)
be seller i’s equilibrium expected profit. Notice that pi∗i (p
∗|h) is strictly concave in p∗. This is because
an increase in the equilibrium pooling price expands the revenue of a high quality seller, and it also
increases the investment of the low quality seller in misleading advertising, which in turn increases the
likelihood of a tie — i.e., the probability that (ex post) the buyer has not enough information to infer
sellers’ qualities, and thus bases his consumption choice only on his priors. Hence, the no deviation
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condition for seller i when it is of high quality is
pidi (p
∗|h) ≤ pi∗i (p∗|h) ∀i ⇔ p∗ ≤ p∗ (h) ≡ min
i=1,2
1
1− τ i
√
1
ψ
This constraint requires an upper-bound on the equilibrium pooling price. Since the equilibrium decep-
tion level of the low quality seller is increasing in the pooling price, a too high equilibrium price would
reduce so much the probability with which a high quality seller makes a sale to trigger a price deviation
by this seller. Summing up, the set of pooling prices that are not vulnerable to deviations by high quality
sellers and that meet the buyer’s participation constraint is
P∗(h) ≡ {p∗ : p∗ ≤ min{θl + 12 , p∗ (h)}} ,
where it is easy to verify that p∗(l) ≤ p∗ (h) ≤ p∗(l).
Equipped with the above characterization, we can now state the main proposition of the section
which illustrates the key features of pooling equilibria in our game.
Proposition 1. Under A1 and A2, there exists a continuum of pooling equilibria with the following
features:
• Every price p∗ ∈ P∗ ≡ [0, p∗max] can be supported in equilibrium. Moreover, p∗max > 0 is such that
p∗max =
{
p∗(l) ⇔ θl ≥ θ∗
θl +
1
2 ⇔ θl < θ∗
,
where
θ∗ ≡ 1−
√
1−2ψτ2
ψτ2
− 1
2
,
with θ∗ being increasing in ψ and τ .
• For any price p∗ ∈ P∗ the equilibrium deceptive advertising µ∗i is:
µ∗i = ψτ ip
∗ < 1 ∀i = 1, 2 ⇒ µ∗1µ∗2 =
τ1
1−τ1 ,
and implies the following posteriors when the buyer receives two positive ads:
βσ∗ (q1 = h|s1 = h, s2 = h,σ∗) = βσ∗ (q2 = h|s1 = h, s2 = h,σ∗) = 12 .
• The buyer’s equilibrium strategy α∗i (s) is such that:
α∗i (s) =

0 ⇔ si = ∅, s−i = h
τ i ⇔ si = h, s−i = h
1 ⇔ si = h, s−i = ∅
.
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This result echoes the findings of Martimort and Moreira (2010) showing that common agency
games with informed principals may feature pooling equilibria where the informed principals offer the
same allocations regardless of their types — i.e., what they call uninformative equilibria. In our simpler
model, however, since communication can occur also via advertising, even such pooling allocations may
entail some communication (i.e., learning by the common buyer).
Proposition 1 has also some interesting comparative statics implications on the sellers’ deception
behavior. First, for any price p∗ ∈ intP∗, a seller engages in more deceptive advertising the more it
is trusted ex-ante by the buyer — i.e., the higher buyer’s prior on its quality. Essentially, when the
buyer is confident enough that a seller’s product is of high quality, he tends to buy more frequently
from it, yet the seller deceives him more. In fact, since the buyer has just his prior beliefs to guide his
consumption choice, a highly trusted low quality seller behaves opportunistically by exploiting such a
‘reputational’ advantage. Second, the tendency to deceive the buyer is increasing both in ψ and in p∗.
In words, an increase in ψ implies a decrease in the marginal cost of deception, which (ceteris paribus)
fosters deception. The same holds for an increase in the pooling price p∗, which increases the surplus
that can be extracted from the buyer if he is induced to believe that the product is of high quality.
Moreover, in a positive deception equilibrium the buyer behaves according to a 50-50 posterior on
sellers’ quality when he receives two (positive) ads. In fact, were this not true, the buyer would strictly
prefer to buy from one seller, which would (in turn) make the competitor’s costly investment in deception
useless. Hence, being indifferent, the buyer may buy equivalently from either seller. However, it turns
out that the only mixed strategy of the blind buyer sustaining the equilibrium is the most intuitive:
mixing between the sellers according to the prior information he has about their quality — i.e., his bias.
Finally, it is also interesting to notice that whether the maximal pooling price is pinned down by the
sellers’ incentive compatibility constraints or by the buyer’s participation constraint is determined only
by the level of θl (since we have normalized θh − θl = 1). On the one hand, when θl is sufficiently large
(higher than θ∗), sellers’ do not gain much from deceptive advertising, the buyer is happy to buy even
at a relatively large price, so that incentive constraints bound from above the maximal price that can be
charged in a pooling equilibrium. On the other hand, when θl is sufficiently low (smaller than θ
∗) there
is a large potential damage from deception to the buyer, so that the maximal price that can be charged
in equilibrium is on the buyer’s participation constraint.
In the next result we study how this maximal price responds to changes of the parameters of the
model.
Corollary 1. If p∗max = p∗(l), then p∗max is increasing in both τ and ψ.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. A higher ψ makes deception more profitable since
it reduces its (marginal) cost. Similarly, a larger τ makes low quality sellers more eager to deceive the
buyer since it expands the chance of a sale by a low quality seller.
A remark on equilibrium refinements. We conclude the section by arguing that the equilibrium
outcomes sustained by the off-equilibrium beliefs specified in A1 and characterized in Proposition 1
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survive to the weakest version of Divinity (D1) introduced by Banks and Sobel (1987).12 To this purpose,
consider a price deviation p 6= p∗, and assume that the buyer’s strategy is to buy from the deviant seller
with probability α. The equilibrium price p∗ satisfies D1 if and only if αli < α
h
i , where α
h
i is the buyer’s
strategy that makes seller i indifferent between deviating and sticking to the equilibrium price when he
is of high quality — i.e.,
αhi p =
[
τ iµ
∗
j + 1− µ∗j
]
p∗.
By the same token, αli is the buyer’s strategy that makes seller i indifferent between deviating and
sticking to the equilibrium price when he is of low quality — i.e.,
αlip = τ iµ
∗
i p
∗.
It can be easily verified that αhi > α
l
i for every i regardless of p
∗ so that whenever a high quality seller
can gain from deviation, the low quality one does so too. Hence, all pooling equilibria characterized
above meet D1. Essentially, for any given off-equilibrium behavior of the buyer, a high quality seller has
less incentive to deviate than a low quality one because his equilibrium sale probability is higher.
5 Selection, welfare and comparative statics
The multiplicity of equilibria characterized in Proposition 1 opens the door to selection issues. How do
sellers select equilibria? What is the impact of the underlying parameters on the buyer surplus and total
welfare?
It is reasonable to consider the equilibrium that features the highest pooling price, p∗max. In fact,
such equilibrium can be easily calculated by each seller and it is a Pareto dominant outcome for both
of them, making coordination relatively easy. Hence, focusing on the maximal pooling price equilibrium
(p∗max), in the next proposition we perform some relevant comparative statics.
Proposition 2. If sellers coordinate on the pooling equilibrium with the highest price:
• pi∗i (p∗max|h) > pi∗i (p∗max|l).
• pi∗i (p∗max|qi) increases with τ i (and decreases with τ j) for any qi ∈ {l, h}.
• pi∗i (p∗max|l) > pi∗j (p∗max|l) and pi∗i (p∗max|h) > pi∗j (p∗max|h) if and only if τ i > τ j.
The first result is intuitive: a seller enjoys a higher expected profit whenever its product is of high
quality, independently of the trust accorded by the buyer (as reflected by τ i). This is because, regardless
of the buyer’s prior beliefs, deceptive ads are costly yet necessary in order to attract demand when a
seller supplies a low quality item. On the other hand, a seller producing a high quality item reaches the
buyer with certainty at no cost.
12Of course, if our equilibria satisfy D1 they also satisfy the Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion.
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The second result is more subtle. The reason why seller i profit increases with τ i regardless of its
quality is as follows. If seller i produces a low quality good, an increase in τ i expands its incentive
to deceive the buyer, whereby increasing the probability of making a sale, thus expanding own profits.
When, instead, seller i is of high quality, an increase of τ i reduces τ j since qualities are negatively
correlated, which (ceteris paribus) reduces seller j’s incentive to deceive the buyer, thus increasing seller
i’s probability of making the sale.
The third result clearly states that, keeping quality constant, being trusted more by the buyer boosts
profits. Consider first q = h. Then τ i > τ j implies that when seller i has high quality seller j does little
deceptive advertising, which in turn expands seller i’s profits. When, instead, seller i has low quality it
invests more in deceptive advertising, whereby reducing seller j’s profits. Next, consider q = l. Then
τ i > τ j implies that when seller i has low quality exploits more the buyer’s trust and attracts more
demand trough deception than seller j does when it has low quality, resulting in a higher profit for i
than for j.
In this equilibrium one may wonder how the buyer surplus responds to changes of the underlying
parameters. Since in our model the buyer buys only one unit of product, his (expected) utility when he
has observed an identical message from both sellers — and hence his posteriors are 1/2 — and pays the
pooling price p∗max is
v (si = h, sj = h) =
θl+θh
2 − p∗max.
This is because in this case his posterior assigns equal probabilities to both sellers selling a high quality
good. When, instead, the buyer observes a single ad, he infers with certainty the high quality seller and
buys from it, with a resulting utility
v (si = h, sj = ∅) = v (si = ∅, sj = h) = 1 + θl︸ ︷︷ ︸
=θh
− p∗max.
Hence, the (unconditional) expected utility of the buyer before receiving ads in a pooling equilibrium
where both sellers charge the price p∗max is
Es[v(si, sj)] = τ i
[
(1− µ∗j )v (si = h, sj = ∅) + µ∗jv (si = h, sj = h)
]
+
+ τ j [(1− µ∗i ) v (si = ∅, sj = h) + µ∗i v (si = h, sj = h)] .
Setting µ∗i = ψτ ip
∗
max and τ j = 1− τ i, this expression simplifies to
Es[v(si, sj)] = 1 + θl − [1 + τ i (1− τ i)ψ] p∗max. (7)
The economic interpretation of this expression is straightforward. The buyer unconditional ex-
pected utility equals the difference between the highest possible quality θh = 1 + θl and the term
[1 + τ i (1− τ i)ψ] p∗max, which reflects the sellers’ incentive to deceive the buyer when they coordinate on
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the maximal pooling price p∗max.
Indeed, the scalar 1 + τ i (1− τ i)ψ is greater than 1 (as it would be in the monopoly case with given
quality) and it increases in ψ and in
∣∣τ i − 12 ∣∣. When there is no uncertainty about sellers’ quality — i.e.,
τ i = 0 or τ i = 1 — equation (7) simply implies that the buyer’s unconditional expected utility equals
the difference between the high quality item utility and the price. If instead τ i ∈ (0, 1) an additional
loss appears: τ i (1− τ i)ψpmax. The term τ i (1− τ i) is the variance of the Bernoulli distribution with
probability τ i over a seller’s quality and reflects the a priori uncertainty over the quality of either seller.
Clearly, the smaller the distance between τ i and
1
2 , the more the buyer is uncertain as to which seller is
the high quality one, which again increases the ex-ante probability of a wrong purchase.
Clearly, the larger ψ is, the lower is the (marginal) cost of deception and the higher the low quality
seller’s coverage, implying a larger probability of a wrong purchase.
In the next proposition we study how these parameters affect the buyer surplus.
Proposition 3. If sellers coordinate on the pooling equilibrium with highest price:
• The expected buyer surplus, Es[v(si, sj)], is decreasing in τ and increasing in θl if p∗max = p∗(l).
• The expected buyer surplus, Es[v(si, sj)], is decreasing in τ and decreasing in θl if p∗max = θl + 12 .
The reason why the buyer surplus is unambiguously decreasing in τ , the lowest between the two
τ i, is as follows. As τ gets closer to
1
2 the ex-ante uncertainty about sellers’ qualities grows larger.
This makes the ex-ante probability of making a wrong purchase higher, whereby reducing the buyer’s
expected utility, as discussed above. Moreover, when p∗max = p∗(l), sellers in equilibrium exploit the
increased uncertainty by raising the maximum price (p∗max increases with τ), extracting a higher fraction
of the buyer’s surplus.
The reason why the buyer surplus increases with θl when the equilibrium price p
∗
max is pinned down
by the incentive compatibility constraint of the low quality seller — see equation (5) — hinges on the
simple fact that p∗ (l) does not depend on θl, while the expected quality is increasing with it. When,
instead, the equilibrium price is determined by the buyer’s participation constraint — see equation (2)
— a higher minimum quality has a detrimental impact on the buyer’s expected welfare. This is because
a higher θl expands the buyer’s willingness to pay, which induces sellers to profitably charge a higher
price p∗max and deceive him more. The combination of these two effects more than compensates the
positive effect of an increased θl on the average quality the buyer expects to consume, making him worse
off.
Having studied buyer surplus and sellers’ profits, we conclude by analyzing the impact on total
welfare of the model parameters. As with buyer surplus, we evaluate total welfare from the perspective
of a social planner (or a public Authority) who is unaware of the true qualities and forms expectations
on them using the same prior information available to the buyer — i.e., τ1 and τ2. While the expressions
for profits of the low and high quality seller are given in equations (4) and (6) respectively, the ex-ante
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expected total welfare (ETW hereafter) is
ETW = Es[v(si, sj)] + τ i
[
pi∗i (p
∗
max|h) + pi∗j (p∗max|l)
]
+ (1− τ i)
[
pi∗i (p
∗
max|l) + pi∗j (p∗max|h)
]
,
which, using (4), (6) and (7), simplifies to
ETW = 1 + θl − ψτ i (1− τ i) 2 + p
∗
max
2
p∗max,
As before, the comparative statics performed below applies to the case where sellers coordinate on the
highest pooling price, p∗max.
Proposition 4. If sellers coordinate on the pooling equilibrium with highest price, the Expected Total
Welfare is:
• increasing in ∣∣τ i − 12 ∣∣.
• decreasing in ψ.
• increasing in θl when p∗max = p∗(l) or, when p∗max = θl + 12 , if
θl ≤ θw ≡ 1
ψτ i (1− τ i) −
3
2
.
Otherwise it is decreasing.
Proposition 4 has several interesting features. A change in τ i has multiple effects on total welfare.
First, whenever the distance between τ i and
1
2 increases, the ex-ante uncertainty decreases, reducing the
loss in efficiency caused by asymmetric information. In other words, the higher the distance from 12 , the
lower is the low quality sellers’ incentive to deceive the buyer, which is also more likely to consume a
low quality product. Thus, as τ i moves apart from
1
2 the ETW tends to be larger. Moreover, there is
another effect induced by a change of τ i, if the maximal pooling price equals p
∗(l). This effect does not
influence total welfare, but it alters the price causing a transfer between the sellers and the buyer with
no net effect. In particular, recalling that p∗(l) increases with τ , the transfer benefits the sellers (resp.
the buyer) if τ i <
1
2 (resp. >).
An increase in ψ amounts to lower deception costs, thereby inducing more deception and a waste
of resources which is individually rational for a bad quality seller, yet negative from a social welfare
perspective.
The result on θl is better understood by considering each case separately. First, when p
∗
max = p
∗(l),
while not altering the maximum price, an increase in θl simply increases the overall gains from trade. By
contrast, when p∗max = θl +
1
2 , the impact of θl on total welfare is inverted-U shaped. Recalling that the
effect of a change in θl on the equilibrium price washes out when considering total welfare maximization,
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two main forces contribute to explain the result. As before, an increase in θl tends to increase welfare
since it makes the buyer better-off when buying a low quality product. Nevertheless, a higher θl also has
a negative impact on welfare since it tends to increase the equilibrium (maximal) pooling price, which
(ceteris paribus), makes low quality sellers more willing to invest in wasteful deceptive advertising. When
θl is small the former effect outweighs the latter, whose magnitude is proportional to the equilibrium
price (the opposite obtains when θl is large).
5.1 Separating vs pooling equilibria
In this section we study more closely separating equilibria. In this class of equilibria prices fully reveal
quality and beliefs are trivial. Thus, the advertising decisions are redundant and set at zero whenever
costly. In other words, there is no scope for deception when prices signal quality. When advertising is
costless, instead, it may be set arbitrarily. For consistency with the pooling analysis developed so far,
and for comparison purposes, in what follows we will focus on full coverage separating equilibria defined
as follows:
Definition. A full coverage separating equilibrium is a separating equilibrium in which the high quality
seller i sets ρi = 1 — i.e., it fully covers the market with truthful quality ads.
Hence, Bertrand competition with different qualities and zero production costs implies (by standard
arguments) that in a separating equilibrium with truthful advertising the buyer buys from the seller
with high quality at price p∗ (h) = θh − θl = 1, while the low quality seller prices at p∗ (l) = 0. Thus, if
it exists, a separating equilibrium necessarily requires p∗ = (1, 0). Of course, p∗ must not be vulnerable
to deviations by either seller.
The high quality seller clearly cannot gain from deviating. It makes a positive profit at a separating
equilibrium while, because of A1, it would make zero profits following any conceivable deviation. Hence,
the only meaningful departure from equilibrium behavior is for the low quality seller, which may wish to
match the high quality price p∗ (h) inducing a pooling equilibrium and setting the corresponding optimal
deception. Such a deviation would make the buyer uncertain as to who’s who between the sellers and
would allow the low quality seller to win his purchase with some probability. This deviation is viable as
long as the separating price of the high quality seller is such that there exists a pooling equilibrium with
an identical price p∗ = p∗ (h). If so, the separating equilibrium would be destroyed by the very existence
of the pooling equilibrium. The conditions under which a full coverage separating equilibrium exists are
given in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a full coverage separating equilibrium
is θl <
1
2 . In this parameter region the equilibrium price induced by the separating behavior is higher
than the maximal pooling price.
Hence, for θl <
1
2 the game features a multiplicity of equilibria with a unique separating outcome and
potentially many pooling ones. Notice further that Lemma 3 means that full information transmission
21
might not be achieved in equilibrium as long as the difference between qualities is lower than twice the
lowest quality. That is, a very large quality premium is necessary for a high quality seller to successfully
differentiate in equilibrium: as qualities get closer (i.e., θl grows larger) the incentive to deceive the
buyer becomes so strong that separation cannot be achieved.
Given the multiplicity of equilibria emerging in the parameter region where θl <
1
2 , a natural nor-
mative exercise is the comparison of the welfare properties of the two classes of equilibria characterized
above. Consider a pooling equilibrium with price p∗ ∈ [0, p∗max] and the separating equilibrium with
price p∗ = (1, 0). Can we rank these equilibria according to a welfare criterion? Which one of these
outcomes is the one that makes the buyer better-off?
Proposition 5. Assume that θl <
1
2 , so that the outcome of the game can yield either the separating or
a pooling equilibrium. Then:
• The expected total welfare is unambiguously larger in a separating equilibrium.
• Low quality sellers unambiguously gain from coordinating on a pooling equilibrium.
• High quality sellers instead prefer to coordinate on the separating equilibrium.
• The buyer is unambiguously better-off in a pooling equilibrium if
θl ≤ θ˜ ≡ 1
2
− τ i (1− τ i)ψ
1 + τ i (1− τ i)ψ ,
with θ˜ being decreasing in ψ and decreasing (resp. increasing) in τ i for τ i <
1
2 (resp. >). If,
instead, θl > θ˜, the buyer is better-off in a pooling equilibrium with price p
∗ if and only if
p∗ ≤ 1
1 + τ i (1− τ i)ψ .
To understand why total welfare is unambiguously higher in the separating equilibrium, consider the
most competitive pooling where both sellers charge the competitive price p∗ = 0 so that there is no
deception at equilibrium. It can easily be shown that total welfare in the separating and in the pooling
equilibria is the same. In fact, because p∗ = 0, the low quality seller has no incentive to deceive the
buyer, so that trade is fully efficient. However, since a larger p∗ makes low quality sellers more willing
to invest in deceptive ads, ceteris paribus an increase of p∗ reduces welfare as deception is costly.
Also, the low quality seller gains from the possibility of luring the buyer into buying its low quality
good. This makes low quality sellers happier in the pooling equilibrium since they would not sell in
a separating equilibrium. The reason why high quality sellers prefer to coordinate on the separating
equilibrium is that in this type of outcome they sell with certainty at a price higher than the maximal
pooling one as stated in Lemma 3.
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Interestingly, the buyer may prefer to be deceived in a pooling equilibrium rather than knowing the
quality purchased in the separating equilibrium. The reason why the buyer may prefer such an outcome
rests on the multiplicity implied by such class of equilibria. Suppose that sellers coordinate on a pooling
equilibrium that features a price p∗ close to zero. Then, seller i’s incentive to deceive the buyer is weak
(i.e., µ∗i is small) and the negative effect of deception is negligible. Of course, for θl small enough the
quality premium that must be paid to a high quality seller in the separating equilibrium is high, whereby
making the buyer unambiguously better-off in the pooling outcome.
6 Authority sanctioning and welfare implications
As illustrated in the previous section, the effect of deceptive advertising on buyer surplus is ambiguous.
A natural question from a policy perspective — and in particular from the viewpoint of buyer protection
— is therefore whether it is possible to reduce the overall inefficiency caused by deceptive behavior
and/or improve buyer surplus when pooling equilibria are likely to endanger the buyer.
Hence, suppose that a buyer who has purchased a low quality good advertised as high quality is
given the opportunity to file a complaint with a buyer protection Authority and, with probability γ,
he obtains a refund of the full price.13 In the US, for instance, the FTC has the power to require that
advertisers prove their claims.14 The agency also requires that this information be available to any buyer
who asks for it. If the FTC determines that an advertisement is deceptive, it can stop the ad and order
the sponsor to issue corrections. Some companies are fined for their illegal acts — see, e.g., the FTC
Policy Statement on Deception (1982).
The parameter γ can be interpreted as the Authority’s deterrence power, reflecting the chances it
detects deception and triggers a full reimbursement. Hastak and Mazis (2011), for instance, discuss
thoroughly a type of deceptive advertising which is certainly perceived by buyers but not easily verified
by a court. In particular, an Authority may well face cases where the misleading content of an ad is
neatly perceived yet not necessarily self evident in probation. This provides a natural justification of the
assumption on the Authority’s probabilistic detection capability.
Under this assumption, using the approach developed in the previous section, the optimal coverage
for a low quality seller in a pooling equilibrium becomes
µˆi = ψτ i (1− γ) pˆ,
where pˆ denotes the equilibrium price for any policy such that γ > 0.15 The new outcome is intuitive:
the higher the chance it is forced to a reimbursement, γ, the lower the amount of deception a seller
13The effect of a punishment harsher than full reimbursement is not considered simply because this type of schemes may
violate firms ex-post limited liability constraints, resulting in enforcement problems.
14The Advertising Substantiation Program has been issued by the FTC in April 1979 and it has been discussed thoroughly
by Sauer and Leﬄer (1990).
15Of course, pˆ = p∗ for γ = 0.
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indulges on for a given price.
Following the same reasoning of Proposition 1, we introduce the following result:
Proposition 6. Under A1 and A2, there exist a continuum of pooling equilibria with the following
features:
• Every price pˆ ∈ Pˆ ≡ [0, pˆmax], with pˆmax > 0, can be supported in the pooling equilibrium. Moreover
pˆmax =
{
p(l) ⇔ θl ≥ θˆ
θl +
1
2 ⇔ θl < θˆ
,
where now
p (l) =
1−
√
1−2ψτ2(1−γ)2
ψτ2(1−γ)2 , θˆ ≡ p (l)−
1
2
,
with pˆ (l) being increasing in ψ and τ and decreasing in γ.
• For any equilibrium price pˆ ∈ Pˆ the equilibrium deceptive advertising µˆi is such that
µˆi = ψτ ipˆ (1− γ) < 1 ∀i = 1, 2 ⇒ µˆ1µˆ2 =
τ1
1−τ1 ,
implying the following posteriors when the buyer receives two ads
βˆ (q1 = h|s1 = h, s2 = h, σˆ) = βˆ (q2 = h|s1 = h, s2 = h, σˆ) = 12 .
• The buyer’s equilibrium strategy α∗i (s) is such that
αˆi (s) =

0 ⇔ (si = ∅, s−i = h)
τ i ⇔ (si = h, s−i = h)
1 ⇔ (si = h, s−i = ∅)
.
The result stated in Proposition 6 features the same type of properties of that stated in Proposition 1.
Note, however, that due to the reimbursement chance γ, the convenience of deception is diminished and
misleading ads are reduced accordingly.
To grasp some additional intuition beyond what we have already learnt from Proposition 6, let’s
state the following additional result which parallels Corollary 1:
Corollary 2. If pˆmax = p(l), then pˆmax is decreasing in γ and increasing in both τ and ψ.
The intuition is straightforward. The maximal price that sellers can charge in a pooling equilibrium
with positive deception is decreasing in the Authority’s monitoring intensity γ simply because this
weakens the incentive to deviate and reduces the gap between the pooling and the separating outcomes.
We now proceed to characterize full coverage separating equilibria in this new environment. Indeed,
it turns out that the possibility of a refund doesn’t change the equilibrium characterization. This is
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not surprising, since in a separating equilibrium the buyer will always buy the high quality good —
i.e., the refund will never actually take place. Therefore, Lemma 3 applies practically unchanged. In
particular, pooling equilibria do exist alongside with the separating outcome whenever the quality gain
is substantive relative to the minimum quality (θl <
1
2).
However, because the pooling allocation depends on γ, what clearly changes relative to the analysis
without the Authority — i.e., Proposition 5 — is the welfare distribution and the equilibrium efficiency
in terms of welfare loss . An increase of γ has multiple effects on welfare. First, it reduces the level
of deception chosen by the low quality seller lowering the associated cost, which in turn causes a net
increase in sellers’ aggregate welfare — and a welfare transfer from the bad to the good seller. Second,
a higher γ increases the buyer’s protection from fraud and this protection effect is stronger the higher
the ex-ante uncertainty about quality — i.e., the closer the priors are to 12 . Notice, however, that the
larger is γ the higher are the chances that the buyer gets reimbursed when deceived but the lower the
chances he is actually deceived as the low quality seller airs less and less ads. It can be shown that the
net effect on buyer’s welfare is positive.
We are now able to tackle the natural question motivating this section: What is the optimal policy
set by an Authority? Or, in other words, what is the optimal deterrence γ that a benevolent planner
would want to implement? To this end we shall assume that the Authority faces an enforcement cost
c (γ) which is increasing, convex and satisfies standard Inada conditions — i.e., c′ (γ) > 0, c′′ (γ) > 0,
c′ (1) = +∞ and c′ (0) = 0.16
Proposition 7. Given the cost function above, for any price pˆ that is expected to be charged in a pooling
equilibrium and any prior τ i, the optimal policy γˆ has the following characteristics:
• The policy that maximizes Buyer Surplus γˆb is such that
ψτ i (1− τ i) pˆ (1 + pˆ (1− 2γˆb)) = c′(γˆb).
Notice that γˆb is increasing in ψ and decreasing in the distance
∣∣τ i − 12 ∣∣. The effect of pˆ on γˆb
depends on the level of pˆ: γˆb is increasing (resp. decreasing) in pˆ when pˆ is small enough (resp.
large) and c (·) is not too steep.
• The policy that maximizes Expected Total Welfare γˆw is such that
ψτ i (1− τ i) pˆ (1 + pˆ (1− γˆw)) = c′(γˆw),
which is increasing in ψ, decreasing in the distance
∣∣τ i − 12 ∣∣ and unambiguously increasing in pˆ.
An authority wishes to implement a higher level of protection when the cost of deception is low
(ψ large) and/or incentives to deceive the buyer is high, which is the case when the level of ex-ante
16A cost function that satisfies these assumptions altogether is c (γ) = γ
2
1−γ .
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uncertainty is high (τ i close to
1
2). The first result can be interpreted as the usual result in law and
economics (see, e.g., Becker (1968) which relates the intensity of monitoring of the criminal activity and
the harshness of the punishment). In fact the cost of deception increases (in expected terms) if sellers are
heavily fined for deception. Moreover, the welfare maximizing protection degree is larger the higher the
pooling price: in fact, besides a welfare transfer from the buyer to the sellers, an increase in the pooling
price fosters more wasteful deception, which reduces the overall welfare because of its dead-weight cost.
A less intuitive result is that, when maximizing buyer surplus, the Authority may set lower optimal
protection as the pooling price grows large enough. Indeed, as the price increases, ceteris paribus decep-
tion increases. This in turn makes protection more valuable as the buyers obtains higher reimbursement
more often. However, the benefit of an increase in buyer protection is mitigated by the fact that equi-
librium deception is optimally reduced by the low quality seller as γ grows larger, and it is discovered
more often. When the price is large enough, the combination of these effects makes the expected reim-
bursement increment (implied by a larger γ) relatively smaller than the cost increase. So, at some point,
the protection level that maximizes buyer surplus must be decreasing in the equilibrium price pˆ.
Notice that the effect just described is not present when the Authority maximizes the Expected Total
Welfare. In this case the reimbursement has a neutral effect on welfare as it plays a simple redistributive
role. Hence,
Corollary 3. Buyer protection requires less enforcement than welfare maximization: γˆb < γˆw.
This result offers the surprising prediction that the more an Authority cares about buyers, the less
it should protect them from deceptive advertising.
7 Concluding remarks
We studied a simple Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable
qualities can outwit buyers through their (costly) deceptive advertising. The core contribution of the
paper is the characterization of a class of pooling equilibria where low quality sellers deceive buyers that
are Bayes rational and make their purchase decision on the basis of the available information. It turns
out that, although in these outcomes low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, buyer
surplus can be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium thanks to a novel pro-competitive effect due
to buyers’ ignorance about sellers’ product quality. It is also argued that low quality sellers invest more
in deceptive advertising the better is their reputation vis-a`-vis buyers — i.e., the more a seller is trusted
by buyers, the more pronounced are its incentives to invest in deceptive advertising when it produces a
low quality product.
Finally, as a normative exercise, we have also analyzed a simple policy that involves the enforcement
of a (costly) monitoring technology aimed at detecting misleading and deceptive conducts. We found
that total welfare maximization requires a more intense monitoring technology than buyer welfare. This
is because misleading advertising is decreasing with respect to the intensity of the monitoring technology,
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and buyers might enjoy to be cheated and then reimbursed rather than paying a greater price for a high
quality item. We have also shown that, thanks to this effect, the impact of an increase of the pooling
price on the optimal monitoring intensity is non-monotone, suggesting that in response to higher prices
buyers may benefit from lower protection.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In a separating equilibrium all the information about quality is transmitted by
prices and ads have no informative content. Hence, the coverage of a low quality seller at a separating
equilibrium is optimally set at zero because deceptive ads are costly. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a full coverage equilibrium featuring τ1µ
∗
2 = τ2µ
∗
1. Having observed the
same price and a high signal from both sellers, the buyer uses (1) to update his prior information to a
posterior which equals β∗ (qi|s,σ∗) = 12 for each seller i = 1, 2. Thus, he is ex-post indifferent between
sellers and randomizes buying from i with probability αi (s,σ
∗). However, the only mixed strategy which
makes the equilibrium sustainable is α∗i (s,σ
∗) = τ i, as it will be clear in what follows.
In fact, say seller i has low quality and the pooling equilibrium features price p∗. Then, if seller i’s
coverage is µi ∈ (0, 1), with probability µi the buyer observes seller i’s signal as well as that of seller j
and buys from i with probability α∗i . Thus, seller i’s expected demand is α
∗
iµi and the corresponding
expected profit is
pi∗i (p
∗|l) = α∗iµip∗ − µ
2
i
2ψ ,
which yields an optimal coverage equal to µ∗i = ψp
∗α∗i . Finally, condition τ iµ
∗
−i = τ−iµ
∗
i implies
τ iα
∗
−i = τ−iα
∗
i and thus α
∗
i = τ i. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider full coverage equilibria — i.e., ρi = ρj = 1. Let p
∗ be the price that
is expected to be charged in the candidate (pooling) equilibrium. The set of equilibrium pooling prices
as well as the equilibrium buyer’s strategy are stated in the Proposition and the formal arguments that
allow to derive them have been already illustrated in the text, and will be omitted here for brevity.
In what follows we characterize the equilibrium level of deception. buyer’s posteriors upon receipt of
a high quality ad from both sellers, depend on both sellers’ equilibrium deception strategies. Applying
(1) we have
β∗ (qi = h|si = h, sj = h,σ∗) ≡ β∗i =
τ iµ
∗
j
τ iµ∗j+τ jµ
∗
i
,
where it should be noticed that
β∗i ≷ β∗j ⇔ τ iµ∗j ≷ τ jµ∗i .
The buyer buys from i if β∗i > β
∗
j — provided β
∗
i θh + (1 − β∗i )θl > p∗ — and vice versa. If β∗i = β∗j he
mixes buying from i with probability α∗i = τ i as proven in Lemma 2.
We now argue that the equality of posteriors β∗i = β
∗
j is a necessary condition for the existence of a
positive deception pooling equilibrium. Notice first that µ∗i is the behavior strategy of seller i when his
type is qi = l — i.e., the optimal level of deception he would set behind the veil of ignorance — before
learning his type.
Suppose now that qi = h and qj = l and that, before learning their types, sellers i and j have set
τ iµ
∗
j > τ jµ
∗
i , implying β
∗
i > β
∗
j . Then, this cannot be an equilibrium. In fact, ex-postseller j will sell no
item while spending resources in deceptive advertising. But this implies that seller j is not optimizing
and has an incentive to reduce deception: a contradiction.
Suppose now that qi = l and qj = h and that, before learning their types, sellers i and j have set
τ iµ
∗
j < τ jµ
∗
i , implying β
∗
i < β
∗
j . Then, this cannot be an equilibrium. In fact, ex-post i will sell no item
while spending resources in deceptive advertising. But this implies that seller i is not optimizing and
has an incentive to reduce deception. Because in a weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies must be
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optimal for each possible type of every player, we conclude that a necessary condition for the existence
of a pooling equilibrium with positive deception is
β∗i = β
∗
j ⇔ τ iµ∗j = τ jµ∗i .
The characterization of the equilibrium deception levels has been derived in equation (3), and will be
thus omitted here. To complete the proof it remains to show that under assumption A2 the equilibrium
deception coverage µ∗i is interior if µ
∗
i = τ iψp
∗
max < 1 for i = 1, 2. It is easy to verify that a sufficient
condition for this to be true is
(1− τ)ψp∗max < 1,
which always holds under A2. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The result follows from simple algebra and given the parameter restrictions. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Given a pooling price p∗max, the expected profits of each seller conditional on
its product quality are
pi∗i (p
∗
max|l) =
τ2iψp
∗2
max
2
, pi∗i (p
∗
max|h) =
[
1− (1− τ i)2 ψp∗max
]
p∗max.
Throughout the proof we shall keep in mind the two cases τ i ∈ {τ , 1− τ} and that, depending on
the level of θl, the corresponding p
∗
max is either p
∗
max = θl +
1
2 or p
∗
max = p
∗(l), which can be written as
p∗max =

1−
√
1−2ψτ2i
ψτ2i
if τ i = τ <
1
2
1−
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
ψ(1−τ i)2 if τ i = 1− τ >
1
2
.
Step 1. We start by proving that
pi∗i (p
∗
max|h) > pi∗i (p∗max|l).
The argument is by contradiction. Suppose that the above inequality is reversed. Then, it can be verfied
that it holds if and only if
p∗max ≥ 2ψ[τ2i+2(1−τ i)2] . (A1)
Two cases must be considered depending on the sign of τ i − 1/2.
Case 1. τ i = τ ≤ 1/2.
When θl is large, (A1) requires
p∗max =
1−
√
1−2ψτ2i
ψτ2i
≥ 2
ψ(τ2i+2(1−τ i)2)
⇔ 1− 2τ2i
τ2i+2(1−τ i)2
≥
√
1− 2ψτ2i ,
where, since τ i < 1/2 and ψ < 1 (by assumption A2) both sides of the last inequality are between 0
and 1. Hence, [
1− 2τ2i
τ2i+2(1−τ i)2
]2
≥ 1− 2ψτ2i ⇔ ψ ≥ 4(1−τ i)
2
(2−τ i(4−3τ i))2 > 1,
which violates A2, which provides the desired contradiction.
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By contrast, when θl is small the equilibrium characterization implies that
p∗max = θl +
1
2 <
1−
√
1−2ψτ2i
ψτ2i
< 2
ψ[τ2i+2(1−τ i)2]
,
where the last inequality has been proven in the previous point. Hence the result.
Case 2. τ i = 1− τ ≥ 12 .
Suppose, again by contradiction, that pi∗i (p
∗
max|l) > pi∗i (p∗max|h). In this case inequality (A1) holds if
and only if
1−
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
ψ(1−τ i)2 ≥
2
ψ[τ2i+2(1−τ i)2]
⇔ τ2i
τ2i+2(1−τ i)2
≥
√
1− 2ψ (1− τ i)2,
where both sides of the second inequality are between 0 and 1. Hence,[
τ2i
τ2i+2(1−τ i)2
]2
≥ 1− 2ψ (1− τ i)2 ⇔ ψ ≥ 2−4τ i(1−τ i)
[τ2i+2(1−τ i)2]
2 > 1,
which clearly violates A2. Thus (A1) is not satisfied, which yields the desired contradiction.
Step 2. Let’s now prove that pi∗i (p
∗
max|q) increases with τ i (and decreases with τ j) for any q ∈ {l, h}.
Notice first that, whenever pi∗i (p
∗
max|q) increases with τ i, it necessarily decreases with τ j because
τ i = 1 − τ j . Second, notice than when p∗max = θl + 12 the proof is trivial. So, consider p∗max = p∗(l).
Differentiating with respect to τ i we have
∂pi∗i (p
∗
max|l)
∂τ i
= ψτ ip
∗
max
[
p∗max + τ i
∂p∗max
∂τ i
]
, (A2)
∂pi∗i (p
∗
max|h)
∂τ i
= ∂p
∗
max
∂τ i
+ 2ψ (1− τ i) p∗max
[
p∗max − (1− τ i) ∂p
∗
max
∂τ i
]
. (A3)
Again, we have two cases to analyze depending on the sign of τ i − 1/2. Before proceeding it should
noticed that
∂p∗max
∂τ i
=

2−2ψτ2i−2
√
1−2ψτ2i
ψτ3i
√
1−2ψτ2i
> 0 if τ i = τ <
1
2
2ψ(1−τ i)2−2+2
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
ψ(1−τ i)3
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
< 0 if τ i = 1− τ > 12
.
Let’s proceed then case by case.
Case 1. τ i = τ ≤ 1/2.
In this region of parameters p∗max increases with τ i. Hence, it follows immediately from (A2) that
pi∗i (p
∗
max|l) is increasing in τ i. Moreover,
∂pi∗i (p
∗
max|h)
∂τ i
=
2
[
1−ψτ2i−
√
1−2ψτ2i
]
(τ i(6−τ i)−4)+4ψτ2i (1−τ i)
[
1−
√
1−2ψτ2i
]
ψτ5i
√
1−2ψτ2i
(A4)
Notice first that the denominator is certainly positive. The numerator is negative if and only if
ψ
[
1−
√
1−2ψτ2i
]
1−ψτ2i−
√
1−2ψτ2i
< 4−τ i(6−τ i)
2τ2i (1−τ i)
,
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where it can be verified that left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in ψ. Thus, a necessary
condition for pi∗i (p
∗
max|h) to be decreasing in τ i for at least some τ i < 1/2, is
lim
ψ→1
ψ
[
1−
√
1−2ψτ2i
]
1−ψτ2i−
√
1−2ψτ2i
=
1−
√
1−2τ2i
1−τ2i−
√
1−2τ2i
< 4−τ i(6−τ i)
2τ2i (1−τ i)
.
But, this turns out to be impossible for all τ i < 1/2. Hence, (A4) cannot be negative and we must
conclude that pi∗i (p
∗
max|h) is increasing in τ i.
Case 2. τ i = 1− τ ≥ 1/2.
Differentiating with respect to τ i it follws that
∂pi∗i (p
∗
max|l)
∂τ i
= τ i
[
1−
√
1− 2ψ (1− τ i)2
]
· 2ψ(1−τ i)
2−(1+τ i)
[
1−
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
]
ψ(1−τ i)5
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
.
We shall now prove that (7) cannot be negative. In fact, the first multiplier and the denominator of the
second multiplier are positive and the sign depends on the numerator. Using τ i > 1/2 and ψ ≤ 1, it is
easy to verify that the sign of (7) is negative if and only if√
1− 2ψ (1− τ i)2 < 1− 2ψ(1−τ i)
2
1+τ i
⇔ ψ > 1+τ i2(1−τ i) ≥ 32 ,
which clearly violates A2. Hence, the sign of (7) is positive and pi∗i (p
∗
max|θl) increases with τ i.
Second, we prove that pi∗i (p
∗
max|h) is increasing in τ i. In this case the expression in (A3) specifies to
∂pi∗i (p
∗
max|h)
∂τ i
=
2−2ψ(1−τ i)2−2
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
ψ(1−τ i)3
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
. (A5)
Again, proceeding by contradiction, suppose that (A5) is negative. This is true if and only if
1− ψ (1− τ i)2 <
√
1− 2ψ (1− τ i)2 ⇔ −ψ2 (1− τ i)4 > 0,
which is clearly impossible. Hence, the sign of (A5) is positive and so pi∗i (p
∗
max|h) is increasing in τ i.
Step 3. It trivially follows from τ i < τ j that
pi∗i (p
∗
max|l) = τ
2
i p
∗2
max
2 <
(1−τ i)2p∗2max
2 = pi
∗
j (p
∗
max|l) ,
pi∗i (p
∗
max|h) =
[
1− (1− τ i)2 p∗max
]
p∗max <
[
1− τ2i p∗max
]
p∗max = pi
∗
j (p
∗
max|h) ,
which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is straightforward for p∗max = θl +
1
2 . Consider then p
∗
max = p
∗(l).
Proceeding again by contradiction, notice that
∂Es[v(si,sj)]
∂τ =
(2+ψτ)
[
1−
√
1−2ψτ2
]
−2ψτ2[1+ψτ2]
ψτ3
√
1−2ψτ2 > 0 ⇔ −
2(1−τ)+ψτ [1−2τ+2τ2(2+ψτ2)]
(2+ψτ)2
> 0,
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which is clearly impossible. Hence, Es[v(si, sj)] must be decreasing in τ . The comparative statics with
respect to θl is obvious. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The Expected Total Welfare is
ETW = 1 + θl − ψτ i (1− τ i) 2+p
∗
max
2 p
∗
max.
Let’s proceed point by point.
Point 1. Suppose that p∗max = θl +
1
2 . The ETW is clearly increasing in the distance between τ i and
1
2 .
When, instead, p∗max = p∗(l), we have two different scenarios to analyze: τ i = τ and τ i = 1− τ . We will
prove that ETW is decreasing with respect to τ i in the first case — i.e., when τ i < 1/2 and an increase
in τ i reduces the distance to
1
2 — and increasing in the second — i.e., when τ i > 1/2 and an increase in
τ i increases the distance to 1/2.
First, take τ i = τ . Differentiating with respect ot τ i
∂ETW
∂τ i
= −ψ
[
(1− 2τ i) 2+p
∗
max
2 p
∗
max + τ i (1− τ i) (1 + p∗max) ∂p
∗
max
∂τ i
]
< 0,
because τ i < 1/2 and p
∗
max is increasing in τ i, where the latter inequality follows, by contradiction, from
∂p∗max
∂τ i
=
2−2ψτ2i−2
√
1−2ψτ2i
ψτ3i
√
1−2ψτ2i
< 0 ⇔ −ψ2τ4i > 0,
which is clearly impossible.
Next, take τ i = 1− τ . In this case, because p∗max is decreasing in τ i. Hence, we have to calculate the
whole derivative and argue that
∂ETW
∂τ i
= (1 + 2τ i)
1−ψ(1−τ i)2
[
2ψ(1−τ i)3
1+2τ i
+1
]
−
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
ψ(1−τ i)4
√
1−2ψ(1−τ i)2
> 0. (A6)
Suppose, by contradiction, that ETW is non-increasing in τ i. Then, the numerator of the second
multiplier in (A6) must be negative, which can be true if and only if√
1− 2ψ (1− τ i)2 > 1− ψ (1− τ i)2
[
1 + 2ψ(1−τ i)
3
1+2τ i
]
. (A7)
First, we show that the right-hand side of inequality (A7) is positive. Let
f (ψ, τ i) ≡ ψ (1− τ i)2
[
1 + 2ψ(1−τ i)
3
1+2τ i
]
.
Notice that f (ψ, τ i) is increasing in ψ. Let’s thus maximize it for ψ = 1. Notice that, for all τ i ≥ 12
∂f(1,τ i)
∂τ i
= −2 (1− τ i) 9τ
3
i+(1−τ i)[8−τ i+8τ3i ]
(2τ i+1)
2 < 0.
Thus f (1, τ i) has a maximum at τ i =
1
2 , and it can be readly shown that f(1, 1/2) < 1. Then the
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inequality in (A7) is preserved taking squares on both sides. Hence, (A7) holds if and only if
1− 2ψ (1− τ i)2 >
[
1− ψ (1− τ i)2
(
1 + 2ψ(1−τ i)
3
1+2τ i
)]2
⇔
3 (1− 2τ i) (1 + 2τ i)− 4ψ (1− τ i)3
[
1 + 2τ i + ψ (1− τ i)3
]
> 0,
which is impossible since τ i > 1/2. This provides the desired contradiction.
Point 2. When p∗max = θl +
1
2 the ETW is obviously decreasing in ψ. When p
∗
max = p
∗
l
(l) we have that
∂ETW
∂ψ = −τ i (1− τ i)
[
2+p∗max
2 p
∗
max + ψ (1 + p
∗
max)
∂p∗max
∂ψ
]
< 0,
because p∗max is increasing in τ i, which, in turn, follows by contradiction from the observation that
∂p∗max
∂τ i
=
1−ψτ2i−
√
1−2ψτ2i
ψ2τ2i
√
1−2ψτ2i
< 0 ⇔ −ψ2τ4i > 0.
Point 3. Showing that ETW is increasing in θl when when p
∗
max = p
∗(l) is trivial because p∗(l) does
not depend on θl. When, instead, p
∗
max = θl +
1
2 one can immediately show that
∂ETW
∂θl
= 1− ψτ i (1− τ i)
[
θl +
3
2
]
R 0 ⇔ θl Q θw ≡ 1ψτ i(1−τ i) − 32 . 
Proof of Lemma 3. A full coverage separating equilibrium, as argued in the text, may exist only if
p∗ > p∗max. In other words, a necessary condition for the existence of such an equilibrium is that the
high quality good price p∗ (= 1) at a separating equilibrium is higher that the maximal pooling price
p∗max, because this discourages the low quality seller from mimicking the high quality seller inducing a
pooling equilibrium. Depending on p∗max, the condition p∗ > p∗max specifies into the following two cases:
(i) If p∗max = p∗(l), a separating equilibrium never exists: in fact its existence would require
1 >
1−
√
1−2ψτ2
ψτ2
,
which is never true.
(ii) If p∗max = θl +
1
2 , existence of a separating equilibrium requires 1 > θl +
1
2 or θl <
1
2 .
Thus, separating equilibria exist along with pooling equilibria only when θl <
1
2 (and p
∗
max = θl +
1
2)
while there are only pooling equilibria for θl >
1
2 . 
Proof of Proposition 5. For the proof it is useful the following Table 1 below
Table 1 Separating Pooling
pi∗j (p
∗|h) 1 (1− ψτ2i p∗) p∗
pi∗i (p
∗|l) 0 ψτ2i p∗22
Es[v(si, sj)] θl 1 + θl − [1 + τ i (1− τ i)ψ] p∗
ETW 1 + θl 1 + θl − ψτ i (1− τ i) p∗ 2+p
∗
2
where profits of the low (i) and high (j) quality seller, Buyer Surplus and Expected Total Welfare are
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reported for both the separating and the pooling equilibrium. Profits are calculated ex-post while Buyer
Surplus and Expected Total Welfare are calculated ex-ante.
The result on Expected Total Welfare (first point) follows immediately, as well as the statement on
which equilibrium is preferred by the low quality seller (second point). The third point follows from the
observation that, because θl <
1
2 , p
∗ ≤ p∗max = θl + 12 < 1.
The result on Buyer Surplus follows from subtracting Es[v(si, sj)] under the two equilibrium types
with the pooling price set to its upper limit of p∗max = θl +
1
2 and solving the inequality for θl. This
yields the sufficient condition
θl ≤ θ˜ ≡ 12 − τ i(1−τ i)ψ1+τ i(1−τ i)ψ .
To obtain the necessary and sufficient condition valid for all p∗ ≤ θl+ 12 , it suffices to subtract Es[v(si, sj)]
under the two equilibrium types and solve the inequality for p∗, which yields
p∗ < 11+τ i(1−τ i)ψ . 
Proof of Proposition 6. First, when there is an authortiy that exerts a detection effort γ, the optimal
deception in a pooling equilibrium is
µˆi = ψτ i (1− γ) pˆ
where we have already taken into consideration the fact that the buyer’s strategy entails αˆi(si = h, s−i =
h) = τ i and corner solutions are ruled out — sufficient conditions will be provided at the end of the
proof. The proof of the above statement follows the very same lines of reasoning as of that of Proposition
(1), once recognizing that the expected demand of a low quality seller is αˆiµi (1− γ) pˆ −
(
µ2i /2ψ
)
. We
omit the remaining part of the proof for brevity. Thus, for a low quality seller, deviation and equilibrium
profits are now
pii (pˆ|l) ≡ max
pi
{αi (pi) pi : αi (pi) = 1⇔ pi < pˆ− 1} = pˆ− 1,
pˆii (pˆ|l) ≡ max
µi
{
αˆi (si = h, sj = h, σˆ)µipˆ− µ
2
i
2ψ
}
=
τ2iψ((1−γ)pˆ)2
2 .
A low quality seller does not deviate when
pii (pˆ|l) ≤ pˆii (pˆ|l) ⇔ pˆ− 1 ≤ τ
2
iψ((1−γ)pˆ)2
2 .
Letting
p (l) ≡ 1−
√
1−2ψτ2i (1−γ)2
ψτ2i (1−γ)2
, p (l) ≡ 1+
√
1−2ψτ2i (1−γ)2
ψτ2i (1−γ)2
,
with 1 < p (l) ≤ p (l) . We characterize the set of prices making a low quality seller willing to play
equilibrium strategies
pˆ ∈ Pˆ ′(l) ≡ {pˆ : pˆ ∈ [0, p(l)] ∪ [p (l) ,+∞]} .
As mentioned above, we are interested in positive deception pooling equilibria which are acceptable to
the buyer
Pˆ(l) ≡ Pˆ ′(l) ∩ {pˆ : pˆ ≤ θl + 12} ,
where the second set represents the participation constraint of the buyer. Notice that the latter is
unchanged because the buyer’s posteriors in equilibrium are, again, equal to 1/2.
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Let’s now move to the incentives of a high quality seller. Its profits under deviation and in equilibrium
are, respectively
pii (pˆ|h) ≡ max
pi
{αi (pi) pi : αi (pi) = 1⇔ pi < pˆ− 1} = pˆ− 1,
pˆii (pˆ|h) ≡
[
(1− µˆj) + µˆjαˆi (si = h, sj = h, σˆ)
]
pˆ =
[
1− ψ (1− γ) (1− τ i)2 pˆ
]
pˆ,
which yield the following no deviation condition
pii (pˆ|h) ≤ pˆii (pˆ|h) ⇔ pˆ− 1 ≤
[
1− ψ (1− γ) (1− τ i)2 pˆ
]
pˆ.
Letting
p (h) ≡ − 1
(1−τ i)
√
ψ(1−γ) , p (h) ≡
1
(1−τ i)
√
ψ(1−γ) ,
with
p (h) < 0 < p (h) ,
we have
Pˆ(h) ≡ {pˆ : pˆ ≤ min{p (h) , θl + 12}} .
where, again, the participation constraint of the buyer has already been incorporated. We shall note
that p (h) is increasing in γ. Notice also that it can be shown that p (l) < p (h) < p (l) for ψ ≤ 1 and
τ < 1/2. Considering the above characterization, the result stated in the proposition follows.
Finally, it is easy to show that under A2 there are no corner solutions. 
Proof of Corollary 2. The result follows from simple algebra and given the parameter restrictions. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider θl <
1
2 and let τ i be the generic prior on seller i’s quality. Take a
pooling price equal to pˆ and proceed point by point.
The policy which maximizes buyer’s expected utility in a pooling equilibrium is
γˆb ≡ arg max
γ∈[0,1]
{1 + θl − pˆ− (1− γpˆ)ψτ i (1− τ i) pˆ (1− γ)− c (γ)} ,
where the maximand is buyer surplus minus the enforcemtn cost c (γ). Given the properties of c(.), the
problem is concave and is solved by the unique value γˆb such that
ψτ i (1− τ i) pˆ (1 + pˆ (1− 2γˆb)) = c′ (γˆb) . (A8)
Notice that γˆb is increasing in ψ and decreasing in the distance of τ i from
1
2 because c
′′ (.) > 0. As for
the effect of pˆ on γˆb, applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (A8), we obtain
∂γˆb
∂pˆ =
ψτ i(1−τ i)(1+2pˆ(1−2γˆb))
2ψτ i(1−τ i)pˆ2+c′′(γˆb) T 0 ⇔ γˆb Q γ˜,
where
γ˜ ≡ 1+2pˆ4pˆ . (A9)
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To determine how γˆb vaires with respect to pˆ, substitue γ˜ into the first-order condition (A8), so to obtain
ψτ i(1−τ i)
2 pˆ = c
′ (γ˜) . (A10)
The left-hand side of (A10) is increasing in pˆ, while the right-hand side is decreasing. Assume that
ψτ i(1−τ i)pˆmax
2 > c
′ (γ˜) .
Thus, if c (.) is not too steep, there exists p˜ ∈ (0, p∗max) such that the first-order condtion is 0 when
evaluated at (γ˜, p˜). Notice that p˜ is increasing in ψ and decreasing in the distance of the priors to 12 .
Suppose now that pˆ < p˜. Thus, from (A10) we know the first-order condition has negative sign at γ˜
which directly implies that γˆb < γ˜ and, from (A9), that γˆb is increasing in pˆ. By contrast, when p˜ > p˜
equation (A10) implies the first-order condition has positive sign at γ˜ which in turn implies that γˆb > γ˜
must hold and, from (A9), γˆb is decreasing in p˜.
The policy maximizing the total welfare in a pooling equilibrium is set by the Authority before
knowing sellers’ qualities. Thus it maximizes the ex-ante welfare. Formally, it solves the following
program
γˆw ≡ arg max
γ∈[0,1]
{
1 + θl − ψτ i (1− τ i) pˆ (1− γ) 2+pˆ(1−γ)2 − c (γ)
}
.
It can be easily shown that ETW is strictly concave. Hence, the solution γ∗w solves the following necessary
and sufficient first-order condition
ψτ i (1− τ i) pˆ (1 + pˆ (1− γˆw)) = c′ (γˆw) .
Notice that γˆw is increasing in ψ, decreasing in the distance of τ i from
1
2 and increasing in pˆ because
c′′ (.) > 0. In addition, it can be noticed that γˆw > γˆb. 
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